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Abstract: This article surveys the evolution of Rwandan family planning practices 
from the nation’s mythico-historical origins to the present. Rwanda is typically 
regarded as a patriarchal society in which Rwandan women have, throughout history, 
endured limited rights and opportunities. However, oral traditions narrated by 
twentieth century Rwandan historians, storytellers, and related experts, and 
interpreted by the scholars and missionaries who lived in Rwanda during the nation’s 
colonial period suggest that gender norms in Rwanda were more complicated. 
Shifting practices related to family planning – particularly, access to contraception, 
abortion, vasectomies, and related strategies – are but one arena in which this 
becomes evident, suggesting that women’s roles within their families and 
communities could be more diverse than the historiography’s narrow focus on women 
as wives and mothers currently allows. Drawing upon a range of colonial-era oral 
traditions and interviews conducted with Rwandans since 2007, I argue that Rwandan 
women – while under significant social pressure to become wives and mothers 
throughout the nation’s past – did find ways to exert agency within and beyond these 
roles. I further maintain that understanding historical approaches to family planning in 
Rwanda are essential for informing present-day policy debates in Rwanda aimed at 
promoting gender equality, and in particular, ensuring women’s rights and access to 
adequate healthcare are being upheld. 
 




Lord Jesus, it is you who formed out country. You have given us a long line 
of kings to govern in your place, even though we did not know you. When 
the time fixed by your Providence had arrived. You have been made known. 
You have sent us your apostles; they have opened to us the light… Now that 
we know you, we recognize publicly that you are our Lord and our King.1 
 
With these words, delivered to the nation in 1946, Rwanda’s Mwami (king) Mutara 
Rudahigwa (r. 1931-1959) established Rwanda as the first Catholic kingdom in the 
heart of Africa. A descendent of a line of abami (kings) descended from the powerful 
Abanyiginya clan, Rudahigwa’s declaration represented a marked cultural 
transformation for the nation, whose citizens previously relied upon the abami – each 
of whom was considered a conduit to Imana (god) – to ensure their political and 
spiritual well-being. The mwami and his Umugabekazi (Queen Mother), abamikazi 
(queens), and abwiru (court ritualists) performed rituals associated with the 
indigenous religion, kubandwa, to negotiate the well-being of their people.2  
Rwanda’s dedication to the Catholic Church was the gradual outcome of a 
concentrated effort on the part of missionaries associated with La société des 
missionnaires d’Afrique (also known as the White Fathers or Pères Blancs). The 
White Fathers arrived in Rwanda during the German colonial period from 1895 to 
1916. They established their first missions in 1900 at Save, Mibirizi, Zaza, Nyundo, 
and Rwaza, all of which were strategically placed at a distance from then-Mwami 
Yuhi Musinga’s royal court at Nyanza, but close enough that they were still within the 
                                                
1 Cited in J.J. Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse 
in the Late Colonial Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 40. 
2 Christopher Taylor, Milk, Honey and Money: Changing Concepts in Rwandan Healing 
(Washington: Smithsonian Books, 1992), 66; and Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern 
Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 39. See 
also, Iris Berger, The Kubandwa Religious Complex of Interlacustrine East Africa: An 
Historical Study (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973); Luc de Heusch, ‘Mythe et 
société féodale: Le culte du kubandwa dans le Rwanda traditionnel’, Pourquoi l’éspouser? 
(1971), 205-225; and Alexis Kagame, Un abrégé de l’ethno-histoire du Rwanda (Butare: 
Editions universitaires du Rwanda, 1972). 
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court’s ‘sphere of influence’.3 Their initial conversion efforts met with limited 
success: by 1914, they had only baptized an estimated 10,000 Rwandans, mostly 
among the rural poor.4 Indeed, missionaries’ efforts only began to show signs of 
success after the Belgians took control of Rwanda in 1916, and particularly after their 
colonial administration deposed Musinga in 1931, after he refused to convert to 
Christianity and otherwise resisted Belgian interests in the region.5 Faced with their 
mwami’s deposition, the court notables embraced the Belgians’ chosen successor – 
Musinga’s son, Rudahigwa – who had been secretly taking instruction from the White 
Fathers and seemed more amenable to Belgian interests. As Rudahigwa’s conversion 
progressed over the next decade, many Rwandans – both court notables and civilians 
alike – followed suit. As of December 2018, an estimated forty-four percent of 
Rwandans identified as Catholic, making it the second most prominent religion in the 
country.6 
Much of the historiography on colonial Rwanda focuses on the upheaval that 
Rwanda’s gradual conversation to Catholicism created among court notables who 
served under Musinga and Rudahigwa as they struggled to maintain their indigenous 
religious practices.7 Less commonly addressed, however, are the challenges that 
conversion posed for ordinary Rwandans, many of whom undoubtedly found social 
                                                
3 Carney, op. cit. (note 1), 25. 
4 Carney notes that the White Fathers regarded this number as disappointing, compared to the 
estimated 100,000 Ugandans who had converted to Catholicism by this time. Ibid., 28. 
5 Alison Des Forges, Defeat is the only bad news: Rwanda Under Musinga, 1896-1931 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 237-240. 
6 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook: Rwanda’, updated 27 December 2018, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html. The Catholic 
Church was more prominent prior to the 1994 genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 Tutsi 
civilians were murdered by Hutu Power extremists. However, its Rwandan leadership’s 
widespread complicity in the genocide prompted many Rwandans to leave the church. Today, 
Protestant Christians make up Rwanda’s largest religious community. Timothy Longman, 
Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
7 See for example, Carney, op. cit. (note 1); Des Forges, op. cit. (note 5); Longman, op. cit. 
(note 6); and Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Citizenship and Ethnicity in 
Rwanda, 1860-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).  
 4 
bonds within their families and communities profoundly altered, and their indigenous 
spiritual beliefs ostracized by the missionaries and their more zealous converts as they 
encouraged Rwandans’ adherence to Catholicism and European values. But precisely 
how the spread of Catholicism and related values impacted ordinary Rwandans’ lives 
in the early to mid-twentieth century has not been thoroughly addressed by historians 
and related scholars.8  
To begin addressing this gap, this article explores the intersections between 
Rwandan gender norms and what in Euro-American Anglophone terms is termed 
‘family planning’, and in Kinyarwanda is referred to as kuboneza urubyaro (‘to 
control birth’), prior to and during the colonisation of Rwanda. I begin with a critical 
overview of the sources and methodology that underpins this article. I then discuss the 
value of children in early Rwandan history as represented in one of Rwanda’s most 
popular origin myths, and its relevance for facilitating a more nuanced understanding 
of early Rwandan gender norms. Next, I consider the growing influence of 
Catholicism during the Belgian colonial period, and the impact this had on people’s 
attitudes toward family planning, among other facets of their lives. I then discuss how 
the respective governments associated with the First (1962-1973) and Second (1973-
1994) Hutu Republics approached the subject of family planning. Finally, I analyse 
the present situation in Rwanda. As one of the most densely populated nations in the 
world, and with an estimated sixty per cent of its population under the age of twenty-
five, the current government has introducing various laws and policies to make family 
planning education, medications, and procedures readily available to the public, and 
to ‘sensitize’ the population to their necessity. These policies are taking shape in 
                                                
8 An important exception to this statement is the subject of the introduction of ethnicity by 
Europeans, which will be addressed in greater detail below, and other topics that relate to the 
roots of the 1994 genocide.  
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tandem with the government’s many gender equality initiatives, which seek to 
empower women in politics and in their everyday lives, and for which the post-
genocide government is lauded internationally. I argue that while the Rwandan 
government and the many Rwandans citizens are broadly supportive of gender 
equality, family planning initiatives are often regarded with suspicion for reasons that 
cannot be solely attributed to people’s adherence to Catholic values. Indeed, a key 
challenge facing the state’s efforts to empower women relates to the ongoing social 
pressures endured by many Rwandan women – and by extension, their husbands – to 
bear as many children as possible. 
On Methodology and Underlying Sources 
This article emerges from the margins of various oral historical and 
ethnographic projects I have undertaken in Rwanda since 2007.9 While family 
planning has never been the focus of my research in Rwanda, my interest in this topic 
was peaked by the countless conversations I have had with Rwandans over the years 
who found my decision not to have children – as an adult in a long-term committed 
relationship with a man whom many of her collaborators and research participants 
have met over the years – unimaginable, given the importance placed on having 
children in modern Rwanda. Perhaps for this reason, the subject of children and 
family planning has been often raised by the gatekeepers, collaborators, research 
assistants, and participants with whom I have worked, both informally – in the context 
of casual conversations – and formally – in the context of ethnographic encounters 
                                                
9 I am grateful to Canada’s Social Science and Humanities Research Council for funding my 
initial doctoral and postdoctoral research in Rwanda, as well as the Centre for International 
Governance Innovation’s Africa Initiative, the Carnegie Trust, and the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh for having allowed me to continue conducting historical research in the country. 
Likewise, this article would not have been possible without the incredible support of my 
Rwanda-based research assistants, and the valuable feedback I received from Laura Kelly, 
Agata Ignaciuk, and two anonymous reviewers.  
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and recorded interviews. Throughout these projects, I worked closely with at least one 
of eight research assistants, who since 2007 have provided simultaneously translation 
of conversations and interviews from Kinyarwanda to English, where necessary, and 
similarly helped me produce verbatim transcripts in English of recorded interviews 
and related data.10 To inform my understanding of these fieldwork encounters, in this 
article I bring these sources into conversation with select archived ibitekerezo (oral 
traditions) and related colonial-era sources in which the value of children in Rwandan 
culture is highlighted, as well as other archival sources that speak to public debates 
around family planning since the Rwanda’s independence in 1962.     
The ibitekerezo and related colonial-era sources that are analysed here are taken 
from several scholars’ collections. My primary source for ibitekerezo is the collection 
of historian Jan Vansina (the Vansina Collection) who, between 1958 and 1960, 
documented Rwandan oral traditions as they were told to him by court notables, and 
subsequently archived them at the Royal Central African Museum in Tervuren, 
Belgium and the University of Chicago in the United States.11 Since 2015, Sylvere 
Mwizerwa and I have worked on translating the Vansina Collection, and in 2017 we 
welcomed Jerome Irankunda to our team. We have prioritized the translation of 
ibitekerezo that speak to the experiences of Rwandan men and women from a range 
of backgrounds – not just the political elites that Vansina focused on in his research. 
However, most of the people whose lives have been commemorated in these 
ibitekerezo were, for varying reasons, considered notable because of their interactions 
                                                
10 The research assistants and research participants associated with my earlier fieldwork in 
Rwanda have chosen to remain anonymous in the outcomes I produce associated with these 
research projects. Below, however, I use – with their consent – the real names of the research 
assistants who have helped with the translation of the media articles I rely upon in this article. 
11 I am grateful to historian Sarah Watkins for kindly sharing with me her scans of the 
Vansina Collection. For more information, see The Vansina Collection, ‘Ibitéekerezo: 
Historical Narratives from Rwanda: A Collection of Texts and Translations, 1957-1961’ 
(Chicago: CRL-CAMP Dept. of Photoduplication, University of Chicago Library, 1973).  
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with the court at different points in the nation’s history. We make every effort to 
preserve, as much as is possible, the orality and original meaning of these ibitekerezo. 
That said, the highly symbolic and at times antiquated Kinyarwanda presented in 
these sources, and the lack of annotation related to changes in tone, rhythm of speech, 
and shifts in emotion, among other meaningful forms of communication, means that 
our ability to fully understand the nuances of these sources is likely compromised. 
I also drew upon Rwandan historian Rose-Marie Mukarutabana’s collection 
from her now-defunct website ‘Gakondo’, which contained her translations of the 
ibitekerezo documented by Rwandan historian Alexis Kagame, and linguists André 
Coupez and Thomas Kamanzi, among others.12 Mukarutabana is an expert on 
Rwandan language, history, and cultural heritage, who has advised the work of 
historians Alison Des Forges, Catharine Newbury, David Newbury, and countless 
other scholars since the 1960s. It is her version of the ‘Myth of Kigwa’ that features in 
this article, as to date it remains the most comprehensive version I have been able to 
find in Kinyarwanda, French, and English. Finally, Mwizerwa, Irankunda, and I have 
surveyed ongoing conversations in the Rwandan media in Kinyarwanda and English 
that pertain to changing family planning policies and practices.  
The resulting data are complex and at times contradictory, requiring careful 
triangulation and contextualisation to identify relevant themes and transgressions of 
importance for understanding early Rwandan history. There are, as well, lingering 
gaps in the historical record, which given the sporadic nature of the archival materials 
available on Rwanda – and of particular relevance to this article, the taboo nature of 
some family planning methods – may be impossible to fill. Of equal importance is the 
                                                
12 Rose-Marie Mukarutabana, ‘Gakondo,’ 
http://www.dlblanc.com/Gakondo/en/Myths/Kigwa.php (archived). 
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realisation that many aspects of Rwandan history have been politicised in different 
ways and at different points in the nation’s past.  
The aforementioned ibitekerezo, for example, were one of four different kinds 
of oral traditions through which Rwandan history related to the Nyiginya kingdom 
was preserved and disseminated.13 They were memorised and performed by historians 
and storytellers affiliated with the court at social events as a means of entertaining and 
educating court notables and the public. In this manner, court officials could influence 
how civilians perceived the kingdom’s past, present, and future. It is likely that with 
each new mwami, the ibitekerezo pertaining to previous abami and their courts were 
altered to reinforce the new mwami’s vision for the kingdom and perspective on his 
predecessors. Certainly, in Rwanda’s recent history, the German (1895-1916) and 
Belgian (1916-1962) colonial administrations, and – following the nation’s 
independence in 1962 – the regimes of Presidents Grégoire Kayibanda (1962-1973) 
and Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994) have reinterpreted Rwanda’s monarchical past 
to suit their particular political platforms. Elsewhere, Sarah Watkins and I have 
argued that many Rwandans are still influenced by these competing interpretations of 
the monarchy: generally, the stories they recall and the value they attributed to the 
monarchy as a whole are heavily influenced by their personal political values, among 
other facets of their individual identities.14  
This phenomenon of re-envisioning the past in accordance with shifts in a 
nation’s political sphere is by no means unique to Rwanda. Nonetheless, historians 
                                                
13 The Nyiginya kingdom dominated the region starting in approximately the sixteenth 
century until 1962. The other three kinds of oral traditions maintained by its courts were the 
ubwiru (rituals), ubucurabwange (dynastic lists), and ibisigo (dynastic poetry). Jan Vansina, 
‘Historical tales (Ibitéekerezo) and the History of Rwanda’, History in Africa, 27 (2000), 378-
379. 
14 Erin Jessee and Sarah Watkins, ‘Good kings, bloody tyrants, and everything in between: 
Representations of the monarchy in post-genocide Rwanda,’ History in Africa 41 (2014), 35-
62. 
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and related practitioners have developed a specific theoretical framework for 
addressing the complications that emerge from the politicisation of the past in 
Rwanda and elsewhere in the Great Lakes region of Africa. This framework is centred 
on political scientist Liisa Malkki’s concept of the ‘mythico-history’, which she 
introduced to encapsulate those narratives that constitute ‘a subversive recasting and 
reinterpretation of [the past] in fundamentally moral terms’.15 This concept was 
grounded in her research among ethnic Hutu refugees who were living in Tanzania in 
the 1990s after fleeing the 1972 genocide in neighbouring Burundi.16 She found these 
refugees had developed an extreme form of Hutu nationalism that shaped how they 
spoke about Burundi’s past and their forced migration to Tanzania: one that 
demonised the allegedly ‘foreign’ and inherently ‘evil’ Tutsi ‘trickster[s]’ who had 
perpetrated the genocide.17  
This trope relied on the long-discredited ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ introduced to the 
region by European social scientists in the early 1900s, which wrongly maintained 
that the predominantly pastoralist Tutsi – by virtue of their alleged superior beauty 
and intellect, and lighter skin – were the semi-Caucasian descendants of the biblical 
figure Ham, and therefore were the natural rulers compared to their allegedly ‘pure 
                                                
15 Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu 
Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), 54. See also, Yolande 
Bouka, ‘(Oral) History of Violence: Conflicting Narratives in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ Oral 
History Forum d’Histoire Orale 33 (2013), 7; Jennie Burnet, ‘Whose Genocide? Whose 
Truth? Representations of Victim and Perpetrator in Rwanda’, in A. Hinton and K. O’Neill 
(eds.), Genocide: Truth, Memory, and Representation (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2009), 80-111, 96; Erin Jessee, Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda: The Politics of History 
(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 119-120; Jessee and Watkins, op. cit. (note 14), 37-38; 
Elizabeth King, ‘From Data Problems to Data Points: Challenges and Opportunities of 
Research in Postgenocide Rwanda’, African Studies Review 52–3 (2009), 127–148; and Marc 
Sommers, ‘Review of Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National 
Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tazania’, American Anthropologist 99–1 (1997), 218. 
16 Malkki, op. cit. (note 15), 54. For more on the 1972 genocide in Burundi, see for example, 
René Lemarchand, ‘Burundi 1972: Genocide Denied, Revised, and Remembered’, in R. 
Lemarchand (ed.), Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 37-50. 
17 Malkki, op. cit. (note 15), 72. 
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African’ and predominantly agriculturalist Hutu, and hunter-gatherer Twa 
compatriots.18 The German and Belgian colonial administrations used the Hamitic 
hypothesis to justify their preferential treatment of the Tutsi. Further complicating 
matters, in the 1930s the Belgians introduced identity cards that included people’s 
ethnicity as either Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. From this point forward, a person’s socio-
economic status was conflated with their ethnic identity, was inherited patrilineally, 
and took on increasing social salience, gradually subsuming other previously more 
important markers of identity related to a person’s lineage, clan, hill, and region of 
origin, for example.19 In the process, many Rwandans in the region internalised a 
particularly toxic understanding of what it meant to be Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa that set the 
stage for decades of ethnic tension and periodic political violence that was often 
justified in mythico-historical terms.  
The prevalence of mythico-historical interpretations of the past, however, is by 
no means unique to discussions of race and ethnicity in Rwanda. Indeed, it is a 
valuable lens for considering many facets of historical and political inquiry on 
Rwanda due to its ability to provide insight on the meaning that the past has for 
people in the present. It provides a starting point for discussing competing 
perspectives and experiences, as well as the less-often addressed lies, rumours, 
evasions, and silences – among other often overlooked forms of metadata – that 
political scientist Lee Ann Fujii argued can also be an important source of 
                                                
18 Ibid., 68. British physician and ethnologist Charles Seligman was a key proponent of the 
Hamitic hypothesis. His 1930 book Races of Africa distinguishes between Hamite pastoralists 
who were of European descent, and ‘two other African stocks, the Negro and the Bushman.’ 
Charles Seligman, Races of Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), 96. For 
additional information, see Edith Sanders, ‘The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions 
in Time Perspective’, Journal of African History, 10, 4 (1969), 521–532.  
19 Newbury, op. cit. (note 7), 193. 
 11 
information.20 This is particularly true when applied to the oral traditions and life 
histories documented by Vansina and Mukarutabana in the latter years of Rwanda’s 
colonial period, as well as new the oral histories emerging from this research project. 
The Myth of Kigwa: Early Gender Norms and the Value of Children in 
Rwandan Culture 
The ‘Myth of Kigwa’ is a popular and important origin myth that offers a good 
starting point for thinking about the challenges that surround family planning 
initiatives in modern Rwanda. Mukarutabana’s translation – one of several possible 
iterations that have survived in the present – begins with Gasani, one of the wives of 
Nkuba, the King of Heaven, lamenting her inability to have more children, leaving 
her palace ‘empty and silent’.21 A diviner named Imhamvu visited her, prophesized 
that Gasani could soon give birth to a baby boy, and offered to help if Gasani would 
make her part of her retinue. Gasani agreed, and so Imhamvu instructed her to take 
the heart from a bull that Nkuba had recently sacrificed to decide who should succeed 
him as king, and place its heart in a milk jug made from the sacred umurinzi 
(‘protector’) tree.22 Imhamvu instructed her to add warm milk to the jug each morning 
and evening, and nine months later Gasani opened to the jug to find a baby boy. 
Gasani named him Sabizeze, (‘a gift that results from god’s favour’), and his ‘birth’ 
was celebrated throughout the kingdom. Gasani’s status at court was immediately 
enhanced, even as Nkuba – who had been away at war, fighting to expand his 
kingdom’s borders – doubted that Sabizeze was his biological son and threatened to 
                                                
20 Lee Ann Fujii, ‘Shades of truth and lies: Interpreting testimonies of war and violence’, 
Journal of Peace Research, 47, 2 (2010), 231-241. 
21 There is no mention of how many children Gasani had previously. Mukarutabana, op. cit. 
(note 12). 
22 The narrative mentions that prior to being sacrificed, the bull was fed ‘royal saliva’, which 
is often interpreted as meaning the mwami’s semen. This may explain why ultimately Gasani 
did not see Sabizeze as illegitimate, and why as the child grew older he was said to look more 
like Nkuba. Ibid. 
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kill him. Gasani and Imhamvu subsequently conspired with the help of besotted court 
notables to protect Sabizeze by hiding him – a rare and dangerous act of defiance 
against their mwami.23 
The ‘Myth of Kigwa’ offers several insights of importance for understanding 
early Rwandan gender norms. At present, interdisciplinary scholarship tends to stress 
the patriarchal nature of Rwandan society, seemingly since time immemorial.24 This 
consensus is largely informed by observations documented by foreign and Rwandan 
researchers who have studied the nation since its independence in 1962, whom have 
accurately commented upon the strict gender divisions that dictated contemporary 
Rwandan men and women’s lives. However, scholars actually know little about pre-
independence gender norms: historians, in particular, have largely overlooked 
Rwandan women in their analysis of early Rwandan history.25 For example, in 
Vansina’s study of the Nyiginya kingdom, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda, he brief 
summarises women’s status as ‘complex and variable’, and determined by the social 
position of the men in their lives, their marital status and age, and ability to raise well-
mannered children.26  
‘The Myth of Kigwa’ offers insight into precisely how one elite Rwandan 
woman improved her social status by having children, arguably providing a model for 
                                                
23 The mwami had the power to execute people who displeased him, and so resistance to the 
mwami’s authority was rare and required exceptional provocation. Vansina, op. cit. (note 2), 
89-90.  
24 See, for example, Sara Brown’s recent discussion of pre-genocide Rwanda as characterised 
by ‘deeply entrenched patriarchal systems’ in which ‘Rwanda’s women were hard pressed for 
a space to exercise agency.’ Sara Brown, Gender and the Genocide in Rwanda: Women as 
Rescuers and Perpetrators (London: Routledge, 2018), 33; and Sara Brown, ‘Reshaping 
Gender Norms in Post-Genocide Rwanda’, Genocide Studies International, 10, 2 (2016), 233. 
25 There are a few exceptions: Des Forges, Vansina, and historian Sarah Watkins have written 
about abagabekazi who ruled as equals alongside their sons when they became kings during 
the Nyiginya kingdom. Des Forges, op. cit. (note 5); Vansina, op. cit. (note 2); and Sarah 
Watkins, ‘Iron Mothers and Warrior Lovers: Intimacy, Power, and the State in the Nyiginya 
Kingdom, 1796-1913.’ 
26 Vansina, op. cit. (note 2), 31. 
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subsequent generations. As Sabizeze grew older, he became renowned for his 
exceptional beauty and kindness, and so, Gasani’s status and power at court grew.27 
This supports Vansina’s conclusion that while men could gain social status in a 
variety of ways – from being wise advisors, powerful warriors, or having great 
wealth, for example – a primary way that women could enhance their social status 
was to raise beautiful, intelligent, and well-mannered children, particularly sons.28 
However, the ibitekerezo also indicates women – particularly elites – may have 
had greater agency in the past that the historiography on Rwanda typically 
acknowledges. Gasani had the power to get pregnant by means other than direct 
intercourse with her husband, and furthermore was able to draw upon contemporary 
spiritual beliefs to reinforce the validity of doing so. This is evident in the court 
notables’ immediate acceptance of Sabizeze, rather than questioning his legitimacy or 
Gasani’s loyalty to Nkuba. Furthermore, once Sabizeze was born, Gasani’s status as 
his mother made it possible for her to rally supporters within the court to help her 
thwart Nkuba’s plan to kill his ‘illegitimate’ son, which – as her husband and king – 
he had every right to demand. While these factors do not completely contradict the 
prospect that the Nyiginya kingdom – and Nkuba’s mythical reign in particular – was 
                                                
27 As elite men could have multiple wives, it was typically the husband’s favourite wife who 
could exercise the most power within their communities. In the case of abamikazi (queens), 
their political power rested on the abami deciding not only that they were their favourite wife, 
but that they should be named umugabekazi (Queen Mother) to the son whom their husband 
wanted to succeed him – a position that allowed them to share power equally with their 
husband’s successor. In most cases, the abamikazi and abagabekazi (queen mothers) were 
descendants of three powerful matridynastic clans, the Abega, the Abakono, and the 
Abasinga, which ensured that these clans shared monarchical power with the otherwise 
dominant Abanyiginya clan. However, Rwandans often say that all beautiful women 
belonged to the king, regardless of their clan. 
28 It is difficult to reconstruct what precisely Vansina and other historians who work on early 
Rwandan history mean by phrases like ‘well-mannered children’. However, in modern 
Rwanda, great value is placed on raising children who are quiet, do not cry or complain too 
much, contribute to the family by performing chores around the home, and treat their elders 
with respect.  
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patriarchal, they do suggest that greater research is needed to fully understand the 
nuances of early Rwandan gender norms. 
Of similar value, the ‘Myth of Kigwa’ also highlights the importance of 
children in Rwandan culture at least since the early twentieth century, if not earlier. 
Gasani went to great lengths to have more children, potentially at great risk to her 
marriage and life. As Nkuba plotted to kill Sabizeze, Gasani and Imhamvu hid him in 
defiance of their mwami. However, it was Sabizeze’s beauty and good manners that 
ultimately saved his life: in response to the stories that circulated about the child, a 
group of elders finally asked for an audience. Upon seeing that Sabizeze looked like 
Nkuba, they convinced the king to see the child. This part of the story ends happily: 
‘As soon as he set eyes on little Sabizeze, all desire of killing him suddenly left the 
King, and instead, he recognised him, took him into his arms, lifted him high up, then 
set him on his knee, and gave him a name: Imana, Divinity.’29 
But while ‘the Myth of Kigwa’ demonstrates at the immense value Rwandans 
associated with having children, seemingly since the earliest days of the kingdom, it is 
important to note that the privilege of having children was reserved for people who 
were married. In interviews I have conducted across Rwanda since 2007, elders 
acknowledged a tradition they associated with the nation’s pre-Christian past whereby 
young unmarried girls who became pregnant would be abandoned on a small island in 
Lake Kivu known as Kabakobwa. Elders spoke of this practice as a punishment 
                                                
29 Mukarutabana, op. cit. (note 12). The story goes on to tell of how Sabizeze later overheard 
Gasani talking about how he was conceived, which made him very angry, prompting him to 
reject Gasani and leave heaven, taking with him two siblings, fire, and various domesticated 
animals to help them in their new life on earth. The remainder of the story tells of how they 
settled in what is today northwestern Rwanda among people of the Abazigaba clan, and 
ultimately gave rise to the Nyiginya kingdom. Sabizeze became known as Kigwa (meaning 
‘fallen’) and his descendants gave rise to the Abanyiginya clan, while his siblings gave rise to 
the Abega, Abaha, and Abakono clans. 
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necessitated because a pregnant girl had denied her parents a good dowry.30 As a 
result of a taboo that prohibited harming children, the offending girl could not be 
directly harmed by her parents or her community, nor could they harm her unborn 
child. However, by abandoning her on Kabakobwa, it was expected that the girl 
would die from exposure, starvation, or wild animals.31 That said, some elders argued 
that these abandoned girls likely survived their sentences to live full lives in the 
neighbouring Congo. For example, one elderly woman who lived near Kabakobwa 
noted that a girl who was abandoned in this manner could ‘be eaten by snakes or 
some other wild animals, unless she was lucky enough to be found by Congolese 
men, who would take her’. Many Rwandans believe that throughout Rwandan history, 
poor Congolese men – drawn in by the allegedly superior beauty of Rwandan women 
whom they could otherwise never afford to marry – frequently visited the island in the 
hopes of finding a free bride. They argued that even with the costs associated with 
taking in another man’s baby, Congolese men would see their new Rwandan bride as 
a good deal.32  
Because of the broader stigma and potential for exile or death facing young 
unmarried girls who became pregnant, it is likely that Rwandans had natural methods 
for ending unwanted pregnancies. Such practices are not discussed overtly in the 
ibitekerezo and related sources I have analysed to date, though this is unsurprising as 
these accounts are often highly euphemistic in discussing intimate or taboo matters. 
However, women frequently appear alongside men as spiritual leaders and healers 
                                                
30 In ideal circumstances, the father of a beautiful young girl would be given a cow – a highly 
valued status symbol due to its ability to produce milk and thereby enhance the wealth of the 
recipient – by the father of the intended groom as a form of dowry. There was no punishment 
for the man responsible for getting the young girl pregnant. 
31 Jessee, op. cit. (note 15), 101-102. 
32 Indeed, some Rwandans claim that this explains the origins of the Banyamulenge people in 
the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), who are Kinyarwanda-
speaking and predominantly Tutsi pastoralists.  
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who used their connection to mystical powers, and their knowledge of ritually 
significant animals, plants and trees to divine the future, appease the angry abazimu 
(spirits) of neglected ancestors, and heal their loved ones or inflict suffering upon 
their perceived enemies.  
A classic example of this appears in an ibitekerezo about the battle between 
Umwamikazi Nyirabiyoro – a Queen who commanded many armies in Mubari (north-
western Rwanda) – and Mwami Kigeri Ndabarasa (c. 1708-1741).33 Ndabarasa 
wanted to incorporate her lands into his kingdom, but Nyirabiyoro was a powerful 
sorceress with her own political ambitions. When confronted by Ndabarasa, 
Nyirabiyoro used a range of spells and poisons to bewitch him in an attempt to 
prevent him from overpowering her, including her own vaginal fluids and urine. 
Ndabarasa allegedly had powerful magic at his disposal as well though, and so he 
defeated her. That night, Ndabarasa’s soldiers killed Nyirabiyoro for disrespecting 
their mwami. To appease her spirit, which Ndabarasa anticipated would be vengeful 
due to her violent death, he arranged for a male goat to be sacrificed and placed 
between her legs before she was buried – an act that was simultaneously symbolically 
reminiscent of childbirth and of blocking the physical source of her spiritual power. 
This seemingly unusual burial ritual was intended to prevent Nyirabiyoro’s spirit from 
attacking Ndabarasa from the afterlife. 
In interviews and casual conversations since 2007, many Rwandans have 
recalled that women and girls could have used many different medical plants in the 
past to cause miscarriages that were part of a broader specialist practice of curing 
physical and spiritual illnesses.34 I have never encountered anyone, however, who 
                                                
33 H Kigeri Ndabarasa file #10, The Vansina Collection. This is one of several ibitéekerezo 
related to Nyirabiyoro that can be found in the Vansina Collection. 
34 See, for example, Taylor, op. cit. (note 2).  
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would admit to having used these medicines or to knowing the specific details of how 
they worked. People frequently noted that while such practices were undoubtedly 
widespread, they were highly taboo as children are ‘treasures’ that enrich their family 
and should be protected. Among the more religious – most frequently, Catholic or 
Evangelist Christian – Rwandans I interviewed, a common response was that children 
were a ‘gift from God’ and, as such, abortion (gukuromo inda) was a sin.  
Where people acknowledged the possibility that these practices had been used 
in the past, they were quick to associate them with the dark craft of abarozi 
(poisoners) and other ‘evil’ specialists who it seems were not part of everyday 
Rwandan society, and far removed from the more positively regarded spiritual 
leaders, healers, and diviners associated with kubandwa and other indigenous 
religious practices. One elderly Rwandan woman I interviewed who had served her 
community as an imandwa (initiate of kubandwa), noted that imandwa were 
forbidden to provide abortions ‘as it was taboo to work backwards’, meaning to end a 
life. However, she acknowledged that ‘imandwa were sometimes asked to spiritually 
fight abarozi though, to prevent a woman from having miscarriages’.  
The Decline of the Monarchy and the Rise of Christianity in Rwanda 
For many Rwandans, the decline of the monarchy – beginning with Musinga’s 
deposition in 1931 – was the point when Catholic and European values became more 
prevalent in their society. For rituals to be successful, kubandwa required a legitimate 
monarch who, as a direct conduit to Imana, would perform – sometimes alongside 
court notables or citizens, and other times in relative secrecy – the rituals that enabled 
the well-being of the kingdom.35 Musinga’s deposition by the Belgians demonstrated 
                                                
35 Indeed, Watkins notes that the mwami did not enjoy absolute power, and was under 
constant pressure to perform rituals to ensure the prosperity of his people and their cattle, and 
demonstrate his legitimacy. Watkins, op. cit. (note 25), 76. 
 18 
to many adherents of kubandwa that the colonisers’ God was more powerful than 
Imana. Indeed, several elderly Rwandans I interviewed noted that Musinga’s 
deposition in 1931 caused turmoil among their communities, prompting many once-
devout followers of kubandwa to convert to Christianity. Among historians and 
related scholars, the three years following Musinga’s deposition has been termed ‘the 
Tutsi tornade’, due to the estimated 200,000 elites and peasants – many of whom had 
previously been loyal to the monarchy and followers of kubandwa and other 
indigenous religions – who converted to Catholicism.36  
Musinga’s appointed successor, Rudahigwa, was appointed by the Belgian 
colonial administration without the approval of the abiru (court ritualists). Rudahigwa 
had converted to Catholicism and was generally seen as supportive to Belgian 
interests, prompting him to become known as ‘the Mwami of the Whites’.37 For some 
Rwandans, his authority was undermined by the fact that Musinga still lived and the 
abiru had not approved his succession, as well as Rudahigwa’s refusal to perform 
rituals associated with kubandwa, which by this point was widely condemned by the 
White Fathers as a form of Satanism.38 But as Rudahigwa’s new faith became more 
visible, and with his decision to dedicate Rwanda to Christ the King in 1946, 
Rwandans increasingly converted to Catholicism. In some cases, they merged 
Catholic beliefs and rituals with kubandwa and other indigenous religions, while 
others abandoned their indigenous religious beliefs completely. By the time the 
monarchy was dissolved and Rwandan independence was achieved in 1962, 
kubandwa had become rare and its remaining followers were ostracised by the White 
Fathers and Rwandan converts alike.  
                                                
36 Carney, op. cit. (note 1); and Longman, op. cit. (note 6). 
37 Des Forges, op. cit. (note 5), 241. 
38 Ibid., 241-242. 
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This period of religious transformation had a dramatic impact on women’s 
opportunities for social and political advancement, though once again the 
historiography on this period is limited. Anthropologist Helen Codere’s The 
Biography of an African Society, Rwanda 1900-1960 represents a rare example 
whereby the life histories of women from different social backgrounds during 
Rwanda’s colonial period are considered alongside that of men. In the process, she 
documents a period of heightened economic hardship and social stigma for women. 
While she notes that gender division of labour and the emphasis on Rwandan women 
being good wives and mothers was well-established prior to independence, she 
observed that as Rwandan men became ‘Europeanized men in European occupations,’ 
Rwandan women, regardless of ethnicity or socio-economic status, faced heightened 
economic hardship and social stigma.39 The Rwandan people’s conversion to 
Catholicism and the adoption of related European values meant that Rwandan women 
who had exercised power as spiritual leaders prior to colonisation had few equivalent 
opportunities for advancement within the new Christian religious communities that 
took shape.40 Women who had previously served as powerful imandwa gradually had 
to content themselves with being wives and mothers, as they could no longer practice 
kubandwa in public without being condemned as ‘devil worshippers’.  
Politically prominent women’s status was similarly affected. For example, 
Musinga’s Umugabekazi, the notorious Nyirayuhi Kanjogera, and her successor, 
                                                
39 Helen Codere, The Biography of an African Society, Rwanda 1900-1960: Based on Forty-
Eight Rwandan Autobiographies (Tervuren: Royal Museum for Central Africa, 1973), 138. 
40 Indeed, it is notable that women do not feature in Carney’s comprehensive overview of 
Catholic politics in Rwanda prior to 1994. Carney, op. cit. (note 1). Beyond Rwanda, 
however, historian Richard Volks has demonstrated that Uganda-based missionaries, 
recognising the importance of women’s spiritual leadership in communities where people 
worshipped Nyabingi – a likely mythical Queen whose spirit could possess people, allowing 
them to perform miracles – encouraged practitioners to merge their beliefs with Christian 
theology surrounding the Virgin Mary. Richard Volk, Ghosts of Kanunga: Fertility, Secrecy 
and Exchange in the Great Lakes of East Africa (Suffolk: James Currey, 2009), 18. 
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Nyiramavugo Kankazi, increasingly took a secondary role to their sons in ruling the 
kingdom.41 This represented a marked shift in monarchical leadership, which 
previously had been designed to ensure power-sharing between the Abanyiginya and 
the powerful matridynastic clans. But it arguably transformed the court into a more 
patriarchal institution that was better suited to the needs of the European colonisers. 
This transformation was perhaps also welcomed by Rudahigwa – the first 
Abanyiginya mwami who was not required to co-rule with his umugabekazi – given 
Musinga’s young age upon becoming mwami had rendered him particularly 
vulnerable to Kanjogera’s influence.  
The Emergence of Family Planning Discourses: The First and Second Hutu 
Republics 
 During the First and Second Hutu Republics, Christian and European values 
continued to become increasingly entrenched in Rwandan society, both in terms of 
people’s everyday lives, and the laws and policies that were introduced. Presidents 
Kayibanda and Habyarimana were devout Catholics who publicly adhered to the 
Vatican’s guidance, even though they also allegedly continued to practice kubandwa 
in private.42 In terms of family planning, they publicly supported the Catholic 
Church’s conservative approach to ‘artificial’ family planning initiatives, from birth 
control medications to abortions.  
                                                
41 Kanjogera had been assigned to serve as the umugabekazi to her husband Mwami 
Rwabugiri’s favourite son by another wife, Rutarindwa. However, soon after Rwabugiri’s 
death in 1895, Kanjogera and her brother Kabare orchestrated a coup at Rutarindwa’s new 
court in Rucunshu that prompted the new mwami’s suicide and allowed Kanjogera to make 
her young son Musinga the next mwami. She subsequently arranged the massacre of 
Rutarindwa’s supporters to ensure the court supremacy of her clan, the Abega, and took an 
active role in ruling the kingdom alongside her son. For more information, see Des Forges, 
op. cit. (note 5), 16-17. 
42 Fieldnotes from the Presidential Palace Museum in Kigali, 2017. Peterson Tumwebaze, 
‘The abortion debate: ‘They should bear the cross!’ The New Times, 7 November 2011, 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/36591. 
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Such policies did not necessarily reflect the presidents’ personal beliefs, 
however. There is evidence that Kayibanda attempted to promote family planning 
initiatives in Rwanda aimed at reducing the number of children couples produced: the 
nation’s first family planning programme was established in 1962, though it was not 
well-documented.43 This is perhaps due to the fact that family planning rhetoric and 
initiatives were not particularly developed in Rwanda or internationally at this time. It 
could also be a reflection of the comparatively limited historiography on the 
Kayibanda regime compared to later periods in Rwandan history. Certainly, 
Kayibanda’s actions suggest he was aware of the dangerous potential of 
overpopulation and growing land disputes between pastoralist and subsistence 
agriculturalists, which Vansina argues would have been a source of concern since the 
late nineteenth century.44 Historian Jean-Paul Kimonyo notes that some of 
Kayibanda’s earliest policies involved expropriating land owned by the 
predominantly Tutsi monarchists who had been killed or forced into exile during the 
political violence that surrounded independence from 1959 to 1964, and redistributing 
it among his supporters.45 He subsequently referenced Rwanda’s overpopulation as a 
key reason to deny the right of the resulting refugees to return to Rwanda as early as 
1966.46 Kayibanda also allowed peasants to drain marshlands and claim lands 
previously reserved for pastures for use in subsistence agriculture, increasing the 
cultivable land in Rwanda by fifty per cent between 1962 and 1969 in an effort to 
address growing concerns about access to land among the rural Hutu majority.47 
                                                
43 Julie Solo, ‘Family Planning in Rwanda: How a Taboo Topic Became Priority Number 
One,’ IntraHealth International (June 2008), 
https://www.intrahealth.org/sites/ihweb/files/attachment-files/fp_in_Rwanda.pdf. 
44 Vansina, op. cit. (note 2), 28. 
45 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Popular Genocide: A Perfect Storm (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2016), 37. 
46 Ibid., 51. 
47 Ibid., 37. 
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Kayibanda’s efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, however. Poor land management 
practices and an over-investment in cash crops like coffee – the international quotas 
for which proved impossible to meet – resulted in major financial losses and an 
economic crisis that exacerbated public frustrations, particularly among educated 
youth.48 Kayibanda attempted to distract people from their dissatisfaction with his 
leadership by inciting anti-Tutsi violence in the schools and private sector in 1972, 
prompting tens of thousands of Tutsi to flee the country.  
As a result of this instability, Habyarimana – previously Rwanda’s Minister of 
Defense and Army Commander – wrested power from Kayibanda during the 1973 
‘bloodless coup’ with the stated purpose of restoring peace.49 He inherited a tense 
political climate rife with ethnic and economic tensions grounded in overpopulation 
and land scarcity, among other factors. Both long-standing challenges had been 
dramatically exacerbated over the last thirty years as a result of a combined decrease 
in infant mortality, and a reduction in breastfeeding and postpartum abstinence 
associated with the introduction of modern medicine and improved nutrition across 
sub-Saharan Africa.50 Indeed, scholars John May, Monique Mukamanzi, and Marcel 
Vekemans reported that Habyarimana’s regime was forced to consider introducing 
policies to promote family planning in the early 1970s. However, in its earliest 
incarnation, concerns regarding ‘the high value attached to Rwandan children’ and the 
‘strong pronatalist influence of Roman Catholicism’ prompted the state to focus 
educating the public about natural birth control methods, such as birth spacing and 
                                                
48 Ibid., 37-39. 
49 Though referred to as a bloodless coup, over the next two years many of Kayibanda’s inner 
circle were executed or died in prison, while Kayibanda was allegedly starved to death. 
Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst & Company, 
2002), 82.  
50 John May, Monique Mukamanzi, and Marcel Vekemans, ‘Family planning in Rwanda: 
Status and Prospects,’ Studies in Family Planning 21, 1 (1990), 22. 
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abstinence, to align with the Catholic Church’s position.51 Nonetheless, a survey 
conducted in 1984 and 1985 found that – despite the creation of a National Office of 
Population (ONAPO) in 1981 and efforts to sensitise Rwandans to the seriousness of 
overpopulation through private Protestant Church-run and national health clinics – 
respondents continued to prioritise having as many children as possible, believing that  
the utmost personal happiness is to have children in order to 
transmit life through them; people without children disappear from 
life forever. Life must be transmitted, especially to sons, as a sacred 
duty to family, ancestors, and lineage. In addition, children are 
viewed as the only security for old age. Finally, having many 
children give honor, prestige, and social, economic, and political 
strength to the parents.52 
Faced with the realisation that natural family planning methods were failing to 
reduce overpopulation, Habyarimana created controversy in 1987 by allowing 
pharmacies to sell condoms and otherwise encouraging Rwandans to exercise 
‘individual freedom with respect to family planning’.53 He simultaneously called upon 
Rwanda’s churches to teach more comprehensive family planning options and 
encourage their followers to have no more than four children. The backlash from 
within his ruling party and the Rwandan Catholic Church resulted in what a Belgian 
Senate report described as ‘Catholic anti-abortion radicals’ – with the support of the 
Ministry of the Interior – raiding pharmacies that had agreed to stock condoms and 
destroying them.54 Simultaneously, the Rwandan Catholic Church renewed its ban on 
                                                
51 Ibid., 21. See also Anicet Kashamura, Famille, Sexualité et Culture: Essai sur les Moeurs 
Sexuelles et les Cultures des Peuples des Grands Lacs (Paris: Payot, 1973); and L. 
Ntezilyayo, ‘Contribution à l’étude de coût-efficacité de la planification familiale au 
Rwanda,’ (unpublished PhD thesis: Institut Africain et Mauricien de Statistique et 
d’Economie Appliquée, 1989). 
52 P. Mukamfizi, Enquête sur la Contraception Traditionelle au Rwanda (Kigali: ONAPO, 
1985); cited in May et. al., op. cit. (note 50), 23. 
53 Previously artificial family planning such as condoms and birth control medications were 
available within the country, but only via private medical facilities. May et. al., op. cit. (note 
50), 29; 25.  
54 Cited in Stephen Childress, ‘From Revolution to Ruin: A Preliminary Look at Rwanda’s 
First Two Presidents, Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvénal Habyarimana, and their 
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artificial family planning methods and refused to distribute contraceptives in its health 
centres, which in many Rwandan communities had become the primary source of 
medical treatment and health education. The Church’s support for the Habyarimana 
regime began to waver, culminating in a 1990 letter that denounced Habyarimana’s 
‘corruption, and regional and ethnic discrimination’.55 This official backlash 
apparently convinced Habyarimana that family planning methods were ‘anathema 
both as public policy and private practice’, and so he did not waiver again in his 
public adherence to the Vatican’s position on birth control.56  
Throughout the First and Second Hutu Republics, women’s participation in 
Rwanda’s public sphere became increasingly limited compared to their male 
compatriots. It is during this period – and particularly under Habyarimana – that 
Rwanda earned its reputation as a deeply patriarchal society, as women were actively 
excluded from politics, commerce, law, and education compared to their male 
compatriots. Genocide scholar Sara Brown notes that by 1992, the Family Code was 
introduced to legally recognise men as the head of Rwandan households, while in 
1994 additional legal reforms prohibited Rwandan women from inheriting property or 
opening bank accounts without the consent of their husbands. These developments 
were undoubtedly part of a patriarchal backlash against the women’s rights 
movements that had been taking shape since the 1980s across Rwanda, and ‘posed a 
threat not just to Rwanda’s patriarchal society but to its non-democratic political 
system as well’.57 
                                                                                                                                      
Administrations,’ (unpublished PhD thesis: University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2015), 375; 
and May et. al., op. cit. (note 50). 
55 Childress, op. cit. (note 54), 375. 
56 Organization of African Unity, ‘Rwanda, the Preventable Genocide: Report of the 
International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,’ 
July 2000, 4:15. 
57 Brown, op. cit. (note 24), 32. 
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This likely resulted in increased limitations on the ideals for women’s everyday 
behavior as well: anthropologist Jennie Burnet notes that when she first began 
working in Rwanda in the early 1990s, the ideal for Rwandan women was to be 
reserved, submissive, respectful, silent, and maternal, focusing their energies on 
maintaining a respectable household and raising polite children.58 Women who 
resisted such expectations could be publicly mocked and ostracized for transgressing 
Rwandan gender norms. Similar analysis by anthropologist Villia Jefremovas in the 
early 1990s observed that “the language of public morality and stereotype is one 
weapon . . . used by both men and women to interpret, manipulate, validate or negate 
control over labour, resources and surplus” produced by women.59  
Family Planning in Present-Day Rwanda 
Habyarimana’s regime was brought to a sudden end by his assassination by 
unknown parties on 6 April 1994. His assassination occurred at the height of 
international efforts to end a civil war that had been initiated by an invasion by the 
Uganda-based Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) on 1 October 1990, which in turn 
radicalised a small cohort of Hutu Power extremists within Habyarimana’s inner 
circle. Following Habyarimana’s death, the Hutu Power-dominated interim 
government began mobilising youth militias to set up roadblocks around Kigali (the 
national capital) and kill Tutsi civilians and their supporters at the roadblocks and 
wherever they sought refuge. The violence spread through all areas of Rwanda that 
were not under RPF control. By the time the RPF formally wrested control of the 
country on 18 July 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans – most of whom were Tutsi 
– had been murdered in what is today referred to in official parlance as the ‘1994 
                                                
58 Jennie Burnet, Genocide lives in us: Women, Memory and Silence in Rwanda (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 44-45. 
59 Villia Jefremovas, ‘Loose women, virtuous wives, and timid virgins: Gender and the 
control of resources in Rwanda’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 25, 3 (1991), 379. 
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genocide against the Tutsi’. An additional two million Rwandans fled to neighbouring 
Congo.60  
In the genocide’s aftermath, the RPF inherited the unenviable task of trying to 
unite a population divided, not only by ethnicity, but by political, regional, socio-
economic and other tensions. They established a transitional government that 
prioritised rapid economic development as a key means of preventing further ethnic 
and political bloodshed, and ensuring long-term political stability, with a high degree 
of success. Their efforts have included a comprehensive plan to address the persistent 
challenge of overpopulation through family planning, first referenced in its ambitious 
‘Rwanda: Vision 2020’, which established a framework in 2000 for transforming ‘our 
country into middle-income [sic.] nation in which Rwandans are healthier, educated 
and generally more prosperous’.61 While it did not outline a family planning policy, 
Vision 2020 set an agenda for further development, and was quickly followed by the 
2002 ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’. This paper highlighted family planning as a 
key component of its human development priority area for public action.62 It further 
identified Rwandan women as allies in the fight to address overpopulation, noting that 
the high rate of population growth ‘could be substantially reduced if women had 
access to family planning services.’63 As part of this, the paper’s authors suggested 
three points of action: that the government invest in improved access to reproductive 
health services to be provided by midwives; that they mainstream discussions of 
                                                
60 For additional information on events leading up to and during the genocide, see Alison Des 
Forges, Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch 
1999); André Guichaoua, From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990-1994 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015); and Jessee op. cit. (note 15). 
61 Republic of Rwanda, ‘Rwanda Vision 2020’, revised 2012, i; 12, 
http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/Vision_2020_.pdf. 
62 Government of Rwanda, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’ June 2002, 35, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Country-Papers-and-
JSAs/Rwanda_PRSP.pdf. 
63 Ibid., 31.  
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fertility as part of health information and adult literacy courses on the grounds that in 
some highly populated countries ‘the promotion of female adult literacy has had a 
major impact on fertility’; and that reproductive health services be made available at 
the district level to ensure accessibility.64 For these reasons, the government’s efforts 
to reduce population growth through family planning were merged early on with 
initiatives aimed at empowering women, promoting gender equality, reducing 
poverty, and improving health care.65 
In 2003, the National Reproductive Health Policy was published, and included 
family planning as one of six priority areas on the grounds that only four percent of 
the nation’s women were using modern family planning methods – a notable decline 
from the thirteen percent who claimed to be using modern birth control methods in 
1992.66 The policy’s authors argued this decline was resulting in high rates of 
maternal mortality – fifteen percent of which were then attributed to unsafe abortions 
aimed at ending unwanted pregnancies – and infant mortality.67 They likewise 
identified several shortcomings in the nation’s family planning programmes that were 
resulting in low utilisation of family planning services, including a lack of sufficiently 
trained medical staff and ample medical supplies, the potential for women who 
wanted to use contraception to encounter significant social stigma or to feel incapable 
                                                
64 Ibid., 45. 
65 Burnet notes that gender equality was particularly important to the RPF’s approach to 
governance from the party’s inception, which explains its prominence throughout the RPF’s 
development policies. Jennie Burnet, ‘Women have found respect: Gender quotas, symbolic 
representation, and female empowerment in Rwanda’, Politics & Gender, 7 (2011), 310. For 
more information, see also Rirhandu Mageza-Barthel, Mobilizing Transnational Gender 
Politics in Post-Genocide Rwanda (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 
66 Republic of Rwanda, ‘National Reproductive Health Policy,’ July 2003, iv, 9, 
http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/policy%20per%20country/rwanda/rwanda_reproductive
health_2003_en.pdf. 
67 Ibid.  
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of making decisions about their reproductive health without their husbands’ 
permission, and financial constraints, among other factors.68  
This led to a series of dedicated family planning policies by Rwanda’s Ministry 
of Health – the first of which was published in 2006 – that outlined comprehensive 
strategies for educating the public about the necessity of family planning, and 
ensuring that the public had access to the relevant resources to begin making informed 
decisions about their reproductive health and plans for building a family.69 The 
Ministry of Health began making a concerted effort to work with religious 
organisations, including the Catholic Church, to provide education about the full 
range of family planning options from which people could choose.70 Given the 
Catholic Church’s longstanding involvement in providing healthcare to Rwanda’s 
citizens – including currently running an estimated one-third of the country’s 
hospitals and clinics – it has proven to be an important stakeholder in the 
government’s efforts to promote family planning.71  
But its collaboration with the Rwandan government has required a careful 
compromise around the topic of artificial birth control: at present, Rwanda’s Catholic 
clinics have – at least in terms of official policy – agreed to educate patients who 
request contraceptives about all possible options. However, a 2016 study by global 
health experts Farmer et al. noted that some religious institutions were providing 
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adherents with ‘mixed messages’ where family planning was concerned.72 
Nonetheless, if a patient is adamant about using contraceptives, which goes against 
Rome’s doctrine, then they should be directed to the nearest government-run mini 
‘health posts’.73 Due to this compromise, in 2017 an estimated 28.6 percent of 
Rwandan women were using modern contraceptives.74  
While the government’s efforts to educate the public about the importance of 
family planning, combined with the Catholic Church’s tenuous support, has arguably 
countered some of the social stigma that people might face in accessing a full range of 
family planning options, conversations in the media and interviews with Rwandans 
reveal that significant challenges remain, particularly where more invasive procedures 
like vasectomies and abortions are concerned.75 In 2011, the Rwandan government 
announced its plan to have 700,000 men voluntarily undergo vasectomies over the 
next three years, almost entirely covered by the national health insurance.76 In 
response, Sylvain Sibomana, the Secretary General of the Rwandan political 
opposition coalition, Forces Democratiques Unifiées (FDU-Inkingi), called for an 
immediate end to what he characterised as a ‘mass emasculation policy’ that was 
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‘pure discrimination against the poor’.77 Another vocal critic of the RPF, Charles 
Kambanda, argued that the plan ‘raised red flags’ as the target group for the procedure 
was ‘men who cannot pay bills for their children’s upkeep’, including the already 
marginalised rural Hutu and Twa, and Tutsi survivors of the genocide.78 While clearly 
motivated by the Rwanda’s political opposition in exile’s desire to undermine 
international support for the RPF, such responses nonetheless speak to the broader 
anxieties that some Rwandan men have regarding policies that threaten to interfere 
with their reproductive potential.79  
For example, a 2017 government report on an umuganda (‘coming together in 
common purpose to archive an outcome’) session in Kamonyi district, reported that in 
response to Deputy Mukakarangwa Clautilde’s discussion of the benefits of family 
planning and negative consequences of overpopulation, a local woman named 
Mukanyandwi Perepetuwa testified that she not only used family planning, but she 
had never experienced any problems with it.80 However, Mukanyandwi added: 
‘family planning for men [meaning vasectomies] is still uncommon. There is still too 
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much pressure, because most of them believe having children is a sign of wealth.’81 
This suggests that the aforementioned cultural beliefs related to the value of having 
children in Rwandan society remain strong. Indeed, the 2012 Ministry of Health 
‘Family Planning Policy’ claimed that such beliefs were particularly prevalent among 
genocide survivors who, understandably, wanted to ‘replace those lost’ and otherwise 
rebuild their lives in the genocide’s aftermath.82 However, I have encountered similar 
sentiments about the necessity of having many children among people across 
Rwanda, regardless of their status relative to the genocide, often associated with the 
proverb abana ni umutungo (‘children are your wealth’).  
In addition to the cultural value associated with having children, a 2017 
Muhabura article reported additional cultural challenges to Rwanda’s family planning 
initiatives that were raised in Karongi district. There, several men argued that ‘even 
though family planning is generally a good thing… only the women should be using 
it.’83 One man was explicit in his reasons for rejecting vasectomies, noting ‘Family 
planning for men? Oh my god, I can’t accept that! Don’t you think it’s like castrating 
yourself? Only women should adopt family planning.’84 Another man commented ‘for 
a man to adopt family planning, he is castrating himself… I can’t do that – family 
planning is for women, not for men.’85 Some women in their community reinforced 
their position as well, with one woman stating: 
Do you think I can allow my husband to adopt family planning for 
men? It’s like castrating him. Do you think he can do well again 
[referring to his ability to have sex]? I can’t say yes to that. I agree 
                                                
81 Kamonyi District, op. cit. (note 80). 
82 Government of Rwanda, ‘Family Planning Policy’, December 2012, 14, 
http://www.moh.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/Docs/Rwanda-Family-Planning-Policy.pdf. 
83 Chief editor, ‘Karongi: Ntibemera ko umugabo yaboneza urubyaro (Karongi: They do not 





family planning is good for the family, but I think it should be my 
responsibility. I don’t think it’s right for my husband to do that.86 
Several important cultural challenges are raised by these comments related to 
Rwandan gender norms, as well as misperceptions about how having a vasectomy 
might negatively impact a couple’s sex life. Feedback from the community, which the 
Muhabura report claims is indicative of attitudes that are prevalent across Rwanda, 
suggest that a man’s virility and ability to have many children are an important 
indicator of his masculinity and, by extension, his social status. It seems the ideals for 
womanhood are slightly more flexible, making it more permissible for women to use 
contraception and natural family planning techniques to reduce the number of 
children they have, though choosing not to have children remains unimaginable for 
most people given the associated social stigma. While women in the present still 
primarily gain social status by being good wives and mothers, it seems many 
Rwandans are now convinced that ‘responsible parenthood’ – having only the number 
of children you can afford – is the best strategy for their families and the nation.87 
Regarding the potential for vasectomies to negatively impact a couple’s sex life, 
the Rwandan government is actively working to education people about this issue. A 
2017 Umubavu article reported that 5,000 Rwandan men – constituting two percent of 
the population – had already undergone successful vasectomies due to medical 
advances that had made the procedure less invasive and less likely to cause 
complications.88 It stressed that the procedure in no way negatively impacted a man’s 
ability to feel or respond to sexual desire, and furthermore benefited the couple by 
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enhancing their ability to adequately support their existing children, and reducing 
overpopulation. The article seems to have been written with the precise intention of 
addressing people’s misperceptions about vasectomies, and mitigating the potential 
for ongoing social stigma toward those who chose to undergo the procedure. 
While Rwandans are arguably becoming more accepting of vasectomies, 
abortion is still heavily stigmatised for both religious and cultural reasons. Prior to 
2012, Rwanda had a highly restrictive abortion law that only permitted the procedure 
in instances where the pregnant woman could find two physicians who would certify 
that she needed the procedure to save her life due to high risk of complications.89 
Women who did not demonstrate this risk, but were faced with unwanted 
pregnancies, were thus forced to either give birth or seek unsafe abortions that carried 
a complication rate of forty-four percent. Complication rates were particularly high 
among rural women who induced the abortion themselves (sixty-seven percent) or 
who sought support from a ‘traditional healer’ (sixty-one percent).90 Simultaneously, 
a study by the community-based organisation, Rwandan Youth Action Movement, 
amplified the voices of young, mostly rural, Rwandan women who had been 
imprisoned for having abortions – many of which were the outcome of pregnancies 
resulting from rape – to demonstrate the need for immediate legal reform.91 
Particularly concerning, these studies demonstrated that rural women who did not 
have the resources to procure safe abortions outside Rwanda were at heightened risk 
of both complications and prosecution. 
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In 2012, the Rwandan government decided to expand the legal grounds for 
abortion to includes instances where the woman’s pregnancy resulted from rape, 
incest, and/or forced marriage, or where significant fetal impairment was detected. 
This required the woman to obtain a court order, with support from her physician, 
prior to undergoing an abortion – a process that could take weeks and, in some 
instances, too late for the woman to have the requested abortion.92 In 2018, a further 
revision was proposed that, if successful, will allow a woman and her doctor to decide 
whether an abortion is necessary without requiring a court order and without the 
potential for criminal charges where the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, and/or 
forced marriage, or where significant fetal impairment was detected.93  
The revised law, while an improvement in terms of women’s rights, has 
encountered significant challenges to its implementation. The Rwandan Catholic 
Church’s leadership held a press conference shortly after the revised abortion law was 
announced, condemning it as a ‘shame upon the country.’94 Bishop Smaragdi 
Mbonyintege argued that ‘anytime you kill a baby in its mother’s bomb is always 
killing a person’95 and called upon the Rwandan government to work with the 
Catholic Church in ‘preventing unwanted pregnancies’.96 The Church’s leadership 
further called for a referendum on the revised law, noting that their followers and 
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those of other Christian faiths would likely reject it as it did not align with their belief 
that only God should be permitted to take a life.97 There is evidence to suggest they 
are correct in this assessment: with an estimated ninety-three percent of Rwandans 
identifying as Christian, broadly speaking, it is possible that the majority of voters 
would uphold the view that abortion is murder and constitutes a crime, rather than a 
basic human right that should be extended to women, albeit on a limited basis.98 This 
perspective was certainly present in the casual conversations I had with Rwandans 
after the revised law was announced in 2012.  
And yet despite this controversy, the Rwandan government has continued to 
work toward implementing the revised law in accordance with its broader efforts to 
respect women’s rights. In addition to sensitising the public to the details of the 
revised law and making abortions more affordable through national health care, on 5 
April 2019 President Paul Kagame pardoned 367 women who had been convicted of 
the crimes of abortion, complicity in abortion and infanticide – a decision that was 
met with accolades from international human rights groups who hope it is a gradual 
step toward decriminalising abortions entirely.99 The Catholic Church has remained 
relatively silent in the media about these pardons. However, six days after the 
announcement, the government newspaper The New Times published an opinion piece 
that, in addition to condemning the Catholic Church for its complicity in the 1994 
genocide and siding with the perpetrators, criticises its ‘endless petitions against the 
30 per cent women minimum quota in governance, petitions against legal abortion 
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and any other progressive policies ever adopted in Rwanda,’ suggesting tensions 
between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Catholic Church remain high.100 
Beyond these challenges around more invasive family planning techniques, 
unmarried men and women in the present may also continue to face social stigma for 
seeking birth control medication and prophylactics. For example, a nurse at a Catholic 
health centre recently commented that she only received requests from couples, which 
she explained by noting that ‘if you don’t have a husband, what do you need family 
planning for?... You have nothing to plan.’101 In conversations with Rwandan youth 
since 2007, people have frequently commented upon the prevalence of this kind of 
attitude among Rwandans, including medical professionals, religious leaders, and 
family members. While Kabakobwa is no longer used to punish unmarried women 
who become pregnant outside marriage, young men seem to now share the social 
stigma of impregnating a girlfriend. Indeed, youth seem keenly aware of the social 
stigma they will be subjected to if they fail to abstain from sex before marriage, 
though as in many nations, this does not make practicing abstinence any easier.  
Conclusion 
While it is evident that Rwandan gender norms have changed over the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries in response to transformations in Rwanda’s political climate 
and religious foundations, attitudes toward family planning are only recently 
beginning to evolve. The sources discussed in this article suggest that the introduction 
of Catholicism and related European values had a significant impact on women’s 
political and spiritual authority. However, the challenges that modern Rwanda faces 
in promoting gender equality and family planning cannot be solely attributed to this 
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religious transformation. The ibitekerezo and interviews discussed above reveal the 
immense social value that Rwandans associate with having children. Furthermore, 
they suggest that Rwandans have historically endured significant social pressure – 
perhaps dating back to the origins of the Nyiginya kingdom –  to have as many 
children as possible. This social pressure is undoubtedly complicated by Catholic 
religious restrictions in some instances – particularly where artificial birth control 
methods are concerned – but its origins are rooted in early Rwandan culture and 
history.  
Nonetheless, the immense value associated with having many children poses a 
challenge to the current Rwandan government’s efforts to promote family planning to 
address the challenges the nation faces as one of the world’s most densely populated 
nations. As the government strives to mainstream gender equality throughout its 
political platform, it is demonstrating notable achievements in terms of women’s 
participation in politics. At present, Rwanda leads the world in terms of the number of 
women holding higher offices in government: in 2008 Rwanda became the first 
country in the world to elect a majority-women parliament, while in the 2013 
parliamentary elections, these results increased with women claiming sixty-four 
percent of the available seats.102  
There is controversy regarding the extent to which current gender equality and 
reconciliation initiatives are improving the everyday lives of rural Rwandan women, 
most notably led by sociologist Marie Berry and political scientist Susan Thomson.103 
They have argued that Rwandan women political elites are better positioned to take 
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advantage of the RPF’s gender equality reforms than their rural counterparts – an 
observation that holds in many contexts beyond Rwanda as well. However, with 
regards to family planning, recent estimates suggest that the government’s efforts to 
mainstream women as valued partners in the push to combat population growth is 
meeting with some success: a 2016 report by the scholars affiliated with the National 
University of Rwanda found that the rate of contraception use by women had 
increased to fifty-two percent over the last five years, which the study attributed to the 
government’s efforts to educate the public and improve public access to health care, 
among other achievements.104 It remains to be seen whether Rwandans will respond 
similarly positively to efforts to sensitise them to the additional benefits of 
vasectomies or the need to decriminalise abortions, even in limited circumstances, 
given the power of long-standing cultural values and more recent religious pressures.  
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